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Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism, Again
Peter Singer, in his essay "Utilitarianism
and Vegetarianism" (Philosoohv and Public
Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 325-37),1 has
gone some distance toward clarifying his
view of the utilitarian case for the ob
ligation to be vegetarian. The fact that
this clearer statement of his position was
prompted, at least in part, by an essay of
mine ("Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and
Animal Rights," Philosophy and Public
Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4, 305-324) provides
me with some assurance that my own essay
was not entirely idle, and though I am
tempted to leave matters stand at that,
there are a few points in Singer's essay
that constrain me to offer this brief
reply. My remarks fall into three cate
gories: (1) Misunderstandings; (2)
The coherence of utilitarianism; and (3)
Singer's attempt to base vegetarianism on
utility.
(1)

~isunderstandings

Singer. I believe, misunderstands my
posi:ion on a number of different counts.
Two deserve a sketch here. The first,
and the principa~ misunderstanding cannot,
1 think, fairly be laid at my door. For
Singer interprets me as holding the view
that utilitarianism ought to be abandoned
because it fails to account for our obli
gation to be vegetarian~ (p. 326) But
this extraordinary position is one I neither
explicitly advance nor imply. What I do
argue, though confessedly in only the
barest outline, in my essay's second part,
is that utilitarianism cannot adequately
account for our duties to severely mentally
enfeebled human beings (henceforth referred
t.o as "non-paradigmatic humans"2.); that
other, non-utilitarian theories (including
my interpretations of Kantianism and egoism)
also fail on this score; that a rights-based
theory seems to provide the most adequate
basis on which to rest our duties to non
paradigmatic humans; and, finally, that
consistency will oblige us to recognize the
basic moral rights of many non-human
animals, because of their relevant similar
ities to non-paradigmatic humans, if we are
rationally constrained to recognize the basis
moral rights of these humans. Thus, it is
because, in my view, utilitarianism, among
other failings,S fails to provide an ade
quate basis on which to ground our duties to

certain human beings, not because it fails
to support vegetarianism, that I believe it
ought to be abandoned.
The obligation to
be vegetarian, in other words, is, in my
view, not a basis on which to test the
adequa~of competing moral theories. It
is, rather, ~ conseguence that follows
from our having developed that theory which,
among the contenders, looks to be the most
reasonable. Thus, to argue, as I do,
that Singer fails to show that utilitarianism
leads to the obligation to be vegetarian is
a very different position than to aruge,
as I most certainly do not. that "utili
tarianism should be abandoned because it
does not lead to vegetarianism." (p. 327)
A second misunderstanding concerns my
view of the relevance of consequences within
a rights-based theory. On this matter
Singer writes the following:
Regan suggests that by basing the case
for vegetarianism on animals' rights
I 'could dispense with the need
systematically to investigate the
probably consequences of changing our
eating habits'. This suggestion
strikes me as quite wrong-headed,
rather like telling the President
that by basing his case on the moral
principle that it is always legitimate
to resist aggression, he can dispense
with the need systematically to inves
tigate the probable consequences of a
nuclear reponse to Soviet military
initiatives. In contrast to Regan,
I think we should always try to find out
as much as possible about the probably
consequences of our actions (p. 328).
What I want to say is that I, too, think
that consequences are relevant to the
determination of what are our obligations,
and that I, too, think it would be quite
"wrong-headed" to exclude considerations
about consequences altogether. This is a
point I have gone to some length to try
to make clear, not only in the particular
case of vegetarianism 4 but elseWhere,S
and it is a point I shall return to in (3)
below. The point I was trying to make in
the passage alluded to by Singer is not
that consequences are always and totally
irrelevant; rather, what I was suggesting
is that if animals have rights, and if
their rights are being violated by p;esent
farming methods, then one could argue that
this treatment is wrong, whatever the
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consequences of these present practices are.
For, if this treatment violates their rights,
then, .whatever the consequences are, one could
maintain that this treatment is wrong. But
though this is the central point I wished to
make, in the passage alluded to by Singer,
I do not believe it is a point that is made
clearly, and the fault, in this case of mis
understanding, ought certainly, I think,
to be laid at my door.
(2) The coherence of utilitarianism

In my essay I distinguished between what I
called the equality of interests principle
and the equality of treatment principle.
In his response, Singer writes as follows:
The only principle of equality I hold is
the principle that the interests of every
being affected by an action are to be taken
into account and given the same weight as
the like interests of any other being . . .
(U)tilitarianiso presupposes this prin
ciple (the equality of interests principle).
The principle of equality of intersts
merely makes it explicit that, because the
principle of utility is the sole basis of
morality, no other principle will limit
the application of the principle of utility,
or affect the way in which it operates
(pp. 328-29).
In my earlier critique of Singer I was pre
pared to grant the equality of interests
principle (henceforth sometimes referred to
as "the equality principle") to utilitar
ianism, on the grounds that that theory pre
supposes it. I now have serious doubts about
the wisdom of being so generous to utilitar
ianism, doubts which the passage from Singer,
just quoted, intensify rather than placate.
For if the equality principle is presupposed
by the principle of utility, and if, in
Singer's words, the equality principle
"limit (s) the application of the principle
of utility," then it appears inconsistent to
claim that utility is "the sale
sole basis of
morality." For it cannot be true that utility
is the sole basis if, in addition to utility,
the equality principle also is basic to
morality. And it cannot be true that utility
forms the basis of morality after a11,if, as
Sipger contends,
COntends, the principle of utility
"presupposes" that of equality and is "limited"
by the principle. It is, it seems to me, a
deficient because incoherent ethical theory
that asserts both that the principle of
~tility is the sole basis of morality and
that there is another principle (equality)

that is presupposed by utility and limits it.
But perhaps Singer believes that the equality
principle is a formal, not a moral, principle.
so that the limits it places on utilitarianism
are not moral but logical or quasi-logical.
And it is true that, if this is the way he
views the equality principle, then the
charge of incoherence, advanced in the argu
ment in the preceding paragraph, could in
principle be met. But only at a price.
For, first, we will want a very careful
argument before it can be reasonable to
agree that equality is a formal principle,
an argument which, II believe it is fair
to say, Singer has not yet advanced in the
writings presently available to us. 6 But,
second, and for present purposes more
importantly, if equality is supposed by
Singer to have the status of a formal
principle, then of course it cannot also be
supposed that that principle is the exclu
sive property of utilitarians. True,
many non-utilitarians (e.g., Kant and
Aquinas) have argued in ways that ~t least
seem to violate the equality principle's
strictures, arguing, it may be alleged,
that though animals and humans have
similar interests, the interests of
humans nevertheless are more important
than the like interests of animals.
But from the fact, assuming that it is
a fact, that some non-utilitarians have
argued in this way, it does not fol19 w that all
non-utilitarians must do so. And this does not
follow even if we suppose that all utilitarians
have been uniformly successful in respecting
the equality principle. 7 In particular,
it does not follow that a rights-based
theory, one in Yhich basic moral rights
are postulated even in the case of
some non-human animals, must violate
the principle of the equality of
interests or cannot insist that this
principle be honored. Thus, if, in
order to avoid the problem of the
coherence of his version of utilitar
ianism, Singer were to endorse the
view that the equality principle is
a formal principle, then he would also
be obliged to recognize that it is a
principle whose use is not limited to
utilitarian moralists.
The same is true of cthe·r
othe·r consid
erations Singer advances in the course
of offering his utilitarian basis for
the obligation to be vegetarian. Many
of these, too, are not in principle
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First, Singer, responding to various
critics' accusations that being a
vegetarian must be a largely symbolic
gesture for someone with his utilitarian
predilections, since one person's boycotting
meat will fail to make any difference to
the way animals are treated in factory
(1) Modern farming methods inflict
farming, replies that in the case of
much suffering on animals.
chickens, for example, "there must be some
point at which the number of vegetarians
(2) A vegetarian diet "does not involve
makes a difference to the size of the
great sacrifices, not in our health,
poultry industry. There must be a series
nor in our capacity to feed the growing
of thresholds,
thresholds,� hidden by the market system
population, nor in the pleasures of the
of distribution, which determine how many
palate" (p. 333).
factory farms will be in existence. In
this case one more person becoming a
(3)
Being a vegetarian is "something
vegetarian will make no difference at
which 'underpins, makes consistent, and
all, unless that individual, added to the
gives meaning to all our other activities
others who are
are� already vegetarians, reduces
on behalf of animals.'" (P. 336, quoted
demand below the threshold level at which
from Animal Liberation, p. 171.)
a new factory farm would have started up
(or an existing one would have remained
(4) "(B)ecoming a vegetarian is a way
in production,
production,� i f industry is declining)"
of attesting to the depth and sincerity
(p. 335). Whether we now know what these
of one's belief in the wrongness of
"thresholds" are is a matter I shall
what we are doing to animals" (p. 337).
return to briefly, when I turn to my second
All these considerations are in principle
point below. What I now wish to stress is
available to advocates of positions other
the paradoxical nature of this aspect of
than the utilitarian one advocated by Singer,
Singer's utilitarian basis of the obli
and though I do not think Singer actually
gation to be vegetarian. What it comes to,
says anything that clearly implies that
I believe, is that,in being a vegetarian
he thinks otherwise, it is important to
I am doing what I ought to do only if it
make this point very clear, since someone
happens to be true that enough other people
might be misled into thinking that, since
happen also to be vegetarians so that, when
these considerations are of great moral
the effects of their boycotting meat are
importance and since they occupy a place
joined with the effects of my boycott, it
of central importance in Singer's account
happens to be the case that some number
of chickens that would have been raised in
of the utilitarian basis for vegetarianism,
they are necessarily restricted to utilitarians. a factory farm are spared that fate. If,
on the other hand, the effects of our
My point is that this would be as mistaken a
collective boycott happen not to make any
view of the logic of these considerations as
difference in the number of chickens raised
it would be to view the equality principle, if
intensively, then, in being vegetarians,
that principle is supposed to be formal, as
we are not doing what we ought to do, not
~ie exclusive property of utilitarians.
because of any failing on our part (assume
(3) Singer's attempt to base vegetarianism
(3)�
we work very hard to persuade others but
on utility
fail to do so), but because of the effects
of the decisions of others (i.e., non
But the above considerations, though they
vegetarians), whose demand for meat more
are not limited to utilitarian moralists,
than offsets the effect of our boycott.
.
cannot be denied them, either, and we may
But to make the rightness of what vegetarians
assume, for present purposes, that these
do contingent upon the decisions of those
considerations collectively do go some way
very
persons Who
who are doing what vegetarians
coward prOViding the utilitarian basis
deplore--and
Singer's view does imply this,
for vegetarianism that Singer seeks. The
I
think--is
paradoxical
at best, all the
question is whether, when coupled with the
more
so
when
we
pause
to
observe that, on
other considerations Singer advances, the
this
view,
all
that
non-vegetarians
need do,
basis he seeks has been achieved. I do
in
order
co
insure
that
they
escape
the
not believe it has, for several reasons.
obligation
to
be
vegetarian,
as
this
is
I shall limit myself to only two.
determined by the vegetarian's impact on

restricted co utilitarian moralists but
mighc consistently be advanced by other,
decidedly non-utilitarian theorists
including those who advance a rights
based theory. These considerations
include the following:
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of utilitarianism cast their oppressive
shadow over Singer's attempt to base
vegetarianism on his version of that theory.
For it is not enough to know, for example,
that there are "thresholds" beyond which the
collective impact of vegetarians does make
a difference to how many factory farms there
are. One wants to know what these thres
thres
holds actuallv~. Or, again, it is not
enough to know that, by a gradual or sudden
switch, by a substantial number of present
meat-eaters, "our capacity to feed the
growing world population" will be increased.
What one also wants to know is whether,
given that we could feed more people, we
(a) will and (b) ought to. As for (a),
there are enormously complicated economic
questions involved, in particular whether,
given a substantial decline in the animal
industry's demand for corn, oats, etc.,
there will be sufficiently attractive eco
eco
nomic incentives for farmers to produce
amounts of grain and other foodstuffs that
would be sufficient to feed an ever growing
world population, an economic possibility
that needs a sound empirical basis, not
hopeful speculation, if the case for its
likelihood is to be established, as it must
be if, like Singer, we rest the case for
vegetarianism on the likely consequences of
alternative courses of action. And as for
(b), what needs to be shown, not assumed,
My second point is this. The central
is that the consequences of feeding an ever
problem for Singer, I believe, is that, in
expanding global population are preferable
order ror him consistently to press the
to taking other, possibly drastic steps
moral case for vegetarianism, he must be
(e.g., involuntary sterilization) to put
in a position to claim to know both what
a lid on population growth. Of course
are the likely consequences of a gradual
there are some for whom easy recourse to
or sudden shift to a vegetarian diet, as
such drastic steps will clash with their
compared with the consequences of the present
understandings of basic human rights or
global dietary habits, and to know that the
common moral intuitions. But it is abso
abso
consequences of the shi~to vegetarianism
lutely essential to realize that Singer
are likely to be better, all considered, than
will have none of this--not appeals to moral
the consequences that. would obtain from perpetu
perpetu
rights, since such appeals are, to him,
ating present practices. In my previous essay I
merely "a concessiOn to populaI' I'hetoric,"S
acknowledged the great deb t we owe to
.
not appeals to "our common moral intuitions"
Singer and others for awakening us to the
since, in his view, this "inbuilt conser
conser
harsh realities of factory farming. What
vatism . . . is liable to take relics of
I failed to take note of, and what Singer,
our cultural history as the touchstones of
in his reply, reaffirms, is that he has
morality" (p. 326). For Singer, all and
also set forth other, relevant consid
consid
everything turns on consequences. And,
erationS that bear on the question of
because of this, the burden of fix1nS
consequences--e.g., that "a vegetarian
and weighing all the. relevant conse
conse
diet does not involve great sacrifices,
quences must be dutifully borne by him,
not in our health, nor in our capacity to
which is why his putative utilitarian
feed the forwing world population, nor
basis for vegetarianism must in prin
prin
in the pleasures of the palate" (p. 333).
ciple be far more complicated, 1
Even granting these additional consider
consider
believe, than even his reply suggests he
ations, however, I believe that the episte
episte
thinks. All of the likely consequences,
mological problems that must haunt all versions
both of p~ailing and alternative dietary
fa~tory

farming, is to continue doing pre
pre
cisely what it is that they are presently
doing--namely living as non-vegetarians! And
if, perchance, the ranks of vegetarians were
to swell to such a degree that their collective
impact on factory farming ~ould close this or
that intensive rearing operation, the non
non
vegetarians, given Singer's position, could
still take steps to escape the obligatori
obligatori
ness of vegetarianism, as this is assessed
by the impact of vegetarians on factory
farming. All that non-vegetarians would
need do is ~ more meat, thereby negating
the collective effect of the vegetarians.
I am not saying that the non-vegetarians
would be doing what is right in this case.
Quite the contrary. What I am suggesting
is that Singer cannot argue that what they
are doing is wrong, by appeal to the impact
of alternative diets on factory farming.
Granted, the number of persons who are
vegetarians does bear on the number of
animals raised in factory farms; and granted
that vegetarians must profoundly wish that
their individual. and collective efforts
will ultimately reduce the number of animals
so raised; nevertheless, the obligation to
be vegetarian cannot be grounded in these
considerations, I believe, except at the
price of the paradox Singer's view is heir
to.

6
practices, for all the affected parties, in
all the affecte~arts of the globe,
in both the short and the long run, must
be fixed and weighed, and the case for
vegetarianism must be established on this
basis alone. I hope it neither is nor seems
unfair to say that, despite the advances
Singer has made in sketching the broad
outlines of a utilitarian case for vege
carianism, he has yet to marshall enough
detailed empirical findings (e.g., detailed
studies regarding its impact on population
growth) to give a finished or compelling
utilitarian basis for the way of life he
advocates.
Now, there is, I believe, a way around
chis problem for those who wish to argue
for the obligatoriness of vegetarianism,
and one that does not oblige us to endorse
the "wrong-headed" view that consequences
are altogether irrelevant to the determi
nation of what is right or wrong. This is
che position set forth in my original essay
on the moral basis of vegetarianism. 10 It
involves arguing, to summarize that position
crudely, that the burden of proof falls on
those who harm the innocent to show why,
in doing so, they do not violate the right
of the innocent not to be harmed, and that,
unless or until those who themselves harm
the innocent, or actively support others
who do so, succeed in showing that they
are not guilty
gUilty of violating the rights of
the innocent, we are justified in viewing
their conduct as violative of the rights
in question. These abstract principles
are then applied to the case of our culture's
use of animals as a food source, both
within and outside the context of factory
farming, the conclusion being that unless
or until we are shown that raising and killing
animals do not violate their rights, we
are rationally entitled to believe and
morally required to act as if they do.
Thus, considerations about consequences
are ~ ruled out as irrelevant by my
position, since whether rights are violated
will turn on considerations that include
considerations about consequences. aut,
u~like Singer's, my position does not put
the burden of proof on me to fix and weigh
all the likely consequences, on all the
interested parties, in all parts of the
globe, etc. The burden is placed on the
non-vegetarian.
The fact that my position does not require
that the moral basis of vegetarianism can
be advanced only on the condition that I
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(or other vegetarians) succeed in fixing
and weighing all the relevant consequences
is, I think, one of its significant strengths,
just as the opposite requirement, in the
case of Singer's position, is, I think, one
of its special weaknesses. Whether it is
possible to provide a rationally compelling
theoretical basis for a position like mine
without having recourse to rights is unclear
to me. But unless the burden of proof is
shifted, as my argument attempts, the case
for vegetarianism can never in principle be
any more certain than our knowledge concern
ing the likely consequences, of our being
or not being vegetarians, on all those
affected, in all parts of the globe, etc .•
etc. The enormous burden of providing
this elusive knowledge, I believe, should
be borne, not by those who are vegetarians,
but by those who are not, and it is one of
the virtues of the use of the notion of
moral rights, a virtue that utilitarianism
lacks, that it provides us with the argu
mentative means of shifting the burden to
those who ought to bear it.
Tom Regan
North Carolina
State University
lUnless otherwise indicated, page refer
ences following quotations are to this
essay by Singer.
2r have explored the moral status of
non-paradigmatic humans in some detail.
See my "An Examination and Defense of
One Argument Concerning Animal Rights,"
Inquirv, Summer, 1979.
~The difficulties justice causes for
utilitarianism are well known, but I am
inclined to believe that considerations
as diverse as the theoretical foundations
of environmental ethics and the value of
friendship also highlight utilitarianism's
shortcomings. On the ill-fit between
utilitarianism and environmental ethics,
see my "The Nature and Possibility of An
Environmental Ethic" (Environmental
Ethics) forthcoming. On the difficulties
the value of friendship causes for utili
tarian theory, see my "A Refutation of
Utilitarianism" (under reView).
4S ee in particular my "The Moral Basis
of Vegetarianism," The Canadian Journal
of Philosoohv, October, 1975. Selections
from this essay are reprinted in Animal
Rights and Human Obligations, edited
by Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall) 1976 and in
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Todav's
roday's Moral Problems, Second Edition,
edited
edit~d by Richard Wasserstrom (New York:
Macmillan) 1979. See also my "Animal
Rights, Human Wrongs," Environmental
Ethics, Summer, 1980. This essay also
will appear, in Polish, in Etyka, forth
forthcoming.
5S ee , for example, my "A
itA Defense of
Pacifism," The Canadian Journal of
PhilosophY, January, 1972, reprinted
reprinte~
in Todav's
rodav's Moral Problems, First Edition,
Ed~tion,
edited by Richard Wasserstrom (New York:
Macmillan) 1975.
6Perhaps it will be objected that Singer
does not regard the equality principle as
a~
a principle that is distinct from the pr~n
principle of utility, despite the fact that he
st.ates that utilitarianism "presupposes"
the eouality
equality principle. If this were true,
then the
~he sting would be taken out of the charge
of incoherence just leveled against his
position. The available evidence seems to
be against this defense of Singer, however,
~owever,
since we find, in his Practical Ethics,
Eth~cs,.
to the pr~n
print.hat Singer attempts to argue !£
ciole of utility from acceptance
ciple
acceptance of the
equality
eq~ality principl~ractical
principle (Practical Ethics,
Ethics
Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 11
1112). All indications are, then, that
as
Singer does regard the two principles
principles,as
distinct and also believes that equality
equal~ty
is more basic than utility. And that,
as II have argued in the above, is incoinco
herent, if (a) the principle of utility
II
is said to be "the sole basis of morality,"
morality,
if (b) the equality principle is itself
viewed as a substantive moral principle, and
if (c) the latter principle is "presupposed"
by the former, in the sense that we are
supposed to be able to argue from acceptance
of the equality principle to acceptance
of that of utility.
7Singer at least suggests that utilitarians
utilitarian~
historically have been successful in respecting
resP7ct~ng
the equality of interests principle, and it
~t
is true that both Bentham and Mill, for
interexample, clearly indicate that animal
~ni~al inter
ests count for something. But it
~t is
~s not
clear at all that they think that we are
constrained to count the like interests of
animals and humans equally. On this see my
discussion of l'1ill
l'1i11 in "The Moral Basis of
Vegetartani,sm,"
Vegetartani.sm
," .£E.. cit.
SThe
The pioneering work of Ruth Harrison
always deserves special mention. See her
Animal Machines (London: Vincent Stuart)

1964.
9peter Singer,
Singer "The Parable of the Fox
and the Un1iberated
Unliber~ted Animals," Ethics,
January, 1978, p. 122.
lOSee, again, my "The Moral Basis of
tarianism, It .£E.. ci t.
Vege tarianism,"
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